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a b s t r a c t
This paper studies the methods for changing thresholds in the absence of secure channels
after the setup of threshold secret sharing schemes. First, we construct a perfect (t, n)
threshold scheme that is threshold changeable to t ′ > t , which is optimal with respect to
the share size. This improves the scheme of Wang and Wong by relaxing the requirement
from q ≥ n + v to q > n with the secret-domain F vq . But these threshold changeable
schemes along with most previously known schemes turn out to be insecure under the
collusion attack of players holding initial shares. By adding a broadcast enforcement term
we enhance the model with collusion security and N options of threshold change. Then
we construct a computationally secure scheme under the enhancedmodel, which involves
much shorter shares and broadcast messages than the perfect schemes. Finally, we discuss
how to realize the enrollment and disenrollment of players, and particularly, how to deal
with L-fold changes of access polices.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
A (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme enables the sharing of a secret among n players such that any t of the players
can later recover the secret from their shares, while any less than t players cannot. The first (t, n) threshold secret
sharing schemes were designed by Blakley [3] and Shamir [17] in 1979. Blakley gave a geometric construction and Shamir
constructed a scheme based on polynomial interpolation. Secret sharing schemes were first proposed as a tool for key
management. Now it is a fundamental building block inmany cryptographic protocols such as threshold signature schemes,
threshold encryption schemes, and secure multiparty computation.
During the setup phase of a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, a dealer (represented as Dealer hereafter) distributes
a share to each of the n players through secure channels. The security requirement is that any fewer than t players cannot
recover the secret from their shares. Therefore, a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme can protect the secret against an
adversary who can corrupt at most t − 1 players. In practice, after the setup of a secret sharing scheme and before the
recovery of the secret, the security policy and adversary structure may change. For instance, some players might have left
the group and the adversary might have corrupted more than t − 1 players. Thus, it is desirable to design a threshold secret
sharing scheme which allows the parameters t and n to change before the recovery of the secret, and which remains secure
under these changes. Many methods have been developed for solving this problem. Examples include share redistribution
(where secure channels between players are needed) [6,8,16], local updates to shares [15,18], and message broadcast [1,4].
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In this paper, we study how to update the threshold t aswell as the number of players n in the absence of secure channels
after the setup of threshold secret sharing schemes. More specifically, the contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We design a perfect (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme that is threshold changeable to t ′ > t . Martin et al. [15]
proved a lower bound for the share size in such schemes and constructed an optimal scheme that achieves the bound
based on geometricmethods.Maeda et al. [12] constructed an almost optimal threshold changeable secret sharing scheme
based on Shamir’s scheme. Our scheme, which is also based on Shamir’s scheme, is optimal. The idea behind our scheme
originates from Wang and Wong [19], where they focused on the communication complexity in secret reconstruction.
In the process, we also improve the scheme of Wang and Wong by relaxing the requirement from q ≥ n + v to q > n,
where F vq is the secret-domain.• There exists a security drawback in our threshold changeable scheme, as well as in many previously known schemes
[6,8,16,15,18]: after the threshold has been changed to t ′, less than t ′ players may get partial information about the
secret from their updated shares. Even worse, any t players can still recover the secret if they keep their initial shares.
In order to overcome this problem, we adopt the model of threshold changeable schemes which is broadcast enforced.
That is, a threshold is validated only after Dealer broadcasts the associated message. The broadcast enforced model has
already been adopted in the dynamic secret sharing scheme [4] and the threshold schemewith disenrollment [11]. Under
this model, we construct a computationally secure (in the sense of [10]) threshold changeable scheme that is secure even
if the adversary gets the entire history of the corrupted players’ shares. If the threshold of the scheme is changeable to
any threshold in {t1, . . . , tN}, with 1 < t1 < · · · < tN ≤ n, then the size of each share is NtN−1H(S) and the size of
the broadcast message required to activate the (changed) threshold tj is
N−j+1
tN−1 H(S), where H(S) denotes the size of the
secret. Since N is usually a small number in practice, and ti > i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the sizes of shares and broadcast messages
are much smaller than those for the perfect scheme.
• We also provide methods for realizing the disenrollment of players and L-fold changes of the access policies under the
condition that no secure channels exist any more after the initial phase.
Organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces related notions and results. Section 3 gives a construction
for an optimal perfect threshold changeable scheme from Shamir’s scheme. Section 4 describes the model of threshold
changeable schemes that we adopt thereafter. Section 5 gives a construction of a computationally secure scheme under the
model of Section 4. Section 6 discusses themethods of realizing the disenrollment of players and L-fold changes of the access
policies.
2. Preliminaries
Let Z≥0 denote the set of nonnegative integers. For integers i ≤ j, the set {i, i+ 1, . . . , j} is denoted by [i, j]. We further
abbreviate [1, j] to [j]. A function µ : Z≥0 → R is negligible if for every positive polynomial p(·), there exists a positive
integer N such that µ(n) < 1/p(n) for all n > N .
For a univariate polynomial f (x) =i≥0 aixi, the coefficient operator [xk] is defined so that [xk]f (x) = ak.
Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of n players and t ∈ [n]. Let S be a finite set of secrets, called the secret-domain,
and let R be a set of random strings. Let H(·) denote the entropy function. A secret sharing scheme over P is a mapping
Π : S × R → S1 × · · · × Sn, where Si is called the share-domain of Pi. Dealer shares a secret s ∈ S among the players
according to Π by first sampling a random string r ∈ R, computing the shares Π(s, r) = ⟨s1, . . . , sn⟩, and then privately
communicating each share si to Pi. For any subset A ⊆ P , SA denotes the set of shares held by all players in A.
For simplicity, the symbol used to denote a set is also used to denote the random variable which ranges over it. For
instance, S denotes the random variable ranging over the secret-domain S according to some specified distribution, and
Π(s, R)|A denotes a random variable ranging over SA induced by the random variable R and the secret s. Whether a symbol
denotes a set or a random variable should be clear from the context.
A (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme (or threshold scheme, in short) over P is a secret sharing scheme Π : S × R →
S1 × · · · × Sn satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) for all A ⊆ P and |A| ≥ t , H(S|SA) = 0;
(2) for all B ⊆ P and |B| < t , 0 < H(S|SB) ≤ H(S).
Condition (1) above states the recoverability of the secret by any t players, and condition (2) states that any fewer than
t players cannot uniquely determine the secret, although they may get partial information of the secret. Furthermore, if it
holds that H(S|SB) = H(S) for all B ⊆ P and |B| < t , then the (t, n) threshold scheme is called perfect. In a perfect (t, n)
threshold scheme, any fewer than t players get absolutely no information about the secret even though they may have
unlimited computational power.
2.1. Threshold changeable schemes
Definition 2.1 (Martin et al. [15]). A perfect (t, n) threshold schemeΠ : S×R → S1×· · ·×Sn is called threshold changeable
to t ′ > t if there exist publicly known functions hi : Si → Ti, i ∈ [n], such that for all A ⊆ P , it holds that
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H(S|TA) = 0, if |A| ≥ t ′
H(S|TA) ≤ H(S), if |A| < t ′,
where TA = { hi(Si) | Pi ∈ A}. We call this a perfect (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable scheme, and call hi the share updating
function.
Since a perfect (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable scheme is initially a perfect (t, n) threshold scheme, we haveH(S|SA) =
H(S) for |A| < t . It trivially follows that H(S|TA) = H(S) for |A| < t .
The efficiency of a perfect (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable scheme is typically measured by the size of each player’s
shares, given by the entropyH(Si) aswell as the size of each updated share,H(Ti). The following theorem gives lower bounds
for these share sizes.
Theorem 2.1 (Martin et al. [15]). LetΠ : S × R → S1 × · · · × Sn be a perfect (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable scheme over P
with the set of share updating functions {hi : Si → Ti | i ∈ [n]}. Then
(1) H(Si) ≥ H(S) for i ∈ [n];
(2)

Pi∈A H(Ti) ≥ t
′
t ′−t+1H(S) for A ⊆ P and |A| = t ′;
(3) maxi∈[n]{H(Ti)} ≥ 1t ′−t+1H(S).
A perfect (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable scheme is called optimal if the bounds in Theorem 2.1 are met with equality.
Martin et al. [15] gave a geometric construction for an optimal perfect (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable scheme. As to our
knowledge, no other constructions for optimal perfect (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable schemes are known. An almost
optimal scheme was proposed by Maeda et al. [12].
3. An optimal perfect threshold changeable scheme
In this section, we construct an optimal perfect (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable scheme, which may be viewed as a
variant of the geometric construction by Martin et al. [15] and the polynomial construction by Wang and Wong [19]. We
also point out some security problems existing in the threshold changeable scheme.
3.1. Our construction: Scheme P-TCSS
Without loss of generality, suppose that the secret domain is S = F t ′−t+1q , where q > n is a prime power.We also assume
that x1, . . . , xn ∈ Fq are n distinct nonzero elements that are publicly known.
Our construction Scheme P-TCSS is as follows.
To share a secret s ∈ F t ′−t+1q , Dealer randomly selects polynomials f1, . . . , ft ′−t+1 ∈ Fq[x], where
f1(x) = a1,0 + a1,1x+ · · · + a1,t−1xt−1,
f2(x) = a2,0 + a2,1x+ · · · + a2,t−1xt−1 + a2,txt ,
...
ft ′−t+1(x) = at ′−t+1,0 + at ′−t+1,1x+ · · · + at ′−t+1,t ′−txt ′−t + · · · + at ′−t+1,t ′−1xt ′−1,
such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1*) for i ∈ [t ′−t+1], ai,i−1 = ai+1,i−1 = ai+2,i−1 = · · · = at ′−t+1,i−1, that is, for i ∈ [t ′−t+1], fi(x) = fi−1(x)+xi−1gi−1(x),
where gi−1(x) ∈ Fq[x] is of degree less than t;
(2*) the secret s = (at ′−t+1,0, at ′−t+1,1, . . . , at ′−t+1,t ′−t).
For i ∈ [n], player Pi gets the share si = ( f1(xi), f2(xi), . . . , ft ′−t+1(xi)) ∈ F t ′−t+1q and the share updating function is defined
by
hi : Ft ′−t+1q −→ Fq
(si,1, si,2, . . . , si,t ′−t+1) −→ si,t ′−t+1.
Proposition 3.1. Scheme P-TCSS is an optimal perfect (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable scheme.
Proof. It is evident that the scheme meets the bounds in Theorem 2.1 with equality. We are left to verify the perfectness
and security required.
Recoverability: We show that for all A ⊆ P and |A| = t , H(S|SA) = 0. Indeed, for any set of t players A = {Pi1 , . . . , Pit }, we
have SA = {( f1(xij), f2(xij), . . . , ft ′−t+1(xij)) | j ∈ [t]}. The players inA can determine f1 by polynomial interpolation
from the shares f1(xi1), . . . , f1(xit ), since f1 has degree less than t . Now let i ∈ [2, t ′ − t + 1] and suppose that
f1, . . . , fi−1 have been determined. Since gi−1(x) = ( fi(x) − fi−1(x))/xi−1 is a polynomial of degree less than t ,
we can determine gi−1 from fi−1(xi1), . . . , fi−1(xit ) and fi(xi1), . . . , fi(xit ) (which are known to A) by polynomial
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interpolation. From gi−1, we can in turn determine fi (since fi−1 has already been determined). By induction, we
can determine ft ′−t+1, and hence recover the secret as the coefficients of ft ′−t+1.
Perfectness: We show that for all A ⊆ P and |A| < t , H(S|SA) = H(S). Equivalently, we require that for all s, s′ ∈ S
and viewA ∈ SA, Pr[Π(s, R)|A = viewA] = Pr[Π(s′, R)|A = viewA]. Without loss of generality, suppose
A = {P1, . . . , Pt−1} and the secret is s = (at ′−t+1,0, at ′−t+1,1, . . . , at ′−t+1,t ′−t) ∈ F t ′−t+1q , which we distribute
through the polynomials f1, . . . , ft ′−t+1. We show that for any other s′ = (b0, b1, . . . , bt ′−t) ∈ F t ′−t+1q , there exist
unique polynomials f ′1, . . . , f
′
t ′−t+1 of degrees less than t, t+1, . . . , t ′ in order, satisfying the conditions (1*)–(2*)1
and f ′i (xj) = fi(xj) for i ∈ [t ′ − t + 1] and j ∈ [t − 1]. Indeed, let
f ′1(x) = f1(x)+ (x− x1)(x− x2) · · · (x− xt−1) · r1(x),
f ′2(x) = f2(x)+ (x− x1)(x− x2) · · · (x− xt−1) · r2(x),
...
f ′t ′−t+1(x) = ft ′−t+1(x)+ (x− x1)(x− x2) · · · (x− xt−1) · rt ′−t+1(x),
where ri is of degree at most i− 1 for i ∈ [t ′ − t + 1], and where f ′1, . . . , f ′t ′−t+1 take the forms
f ′1(x) = b0 + x(· · · ),
f ′2(x) = b0 + b1x+ x2(· · · ),
...
f ′t ′−t+1(x) = b0 + b1x+ · · · + bt ′−txt
′−t + xt ′−t+1(· · · ).
Then, for i ∈ [t ′ − t + 1], ri can be determined by Algorithm 1 below.
Algorithm 1: Determining ri
Input: fi, x1, . . . , xt−1, b0, b1, . . . , bi−1
Output: ri(x)
ri(x) = 0 ;
for j = 0 to i− 1 do
f ′i (x) = fi(x)+ (x− x1) · · · (x− xt−1)ri(x) ;
c = [xj]f ′i (x) ;
ri(x) = ri(x)+ (−1)
t−1(bj − c)t−1
l=1 xl
xj ;
end
It can be verified that distributing the secret s′ through the polynomials f ′1, . . . , f
′
t ′−t+1 constructed above results
in the players P1, . . . , Pt−1 receiving the same shares as they do in distributing s through f1, . . . , ft ′−t+1. Moreover,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between polynomials f1, . . . , ft ′−t+1 and polynomials f ′1, . . . , f
′
t ′−t+1. This
implies that Pr[Π(s, R)|A = viewA] = Pr[Π(s′, R)|A = viewA]. Hence H(S|SA) = H(S).
Threshold Changeability: We show that for all A ⊆ P and |A| = t ′, H(S|TA) = 0. Any t ′ players, say P1, . . . , Pt ′ , can
determine the polynomial ft ′−t+1 from their updated shares ft ′−t+1(x1), . . . , ft ′−t+1(xt ′), since ft ′−t+1 is of degree
less than t ′. Therefore they can recover the secret. 
3.2. Comparisons and security problems
Wang andWong [19] studied the communication complexity of secret reconstruction in secret sharing schemes, showing
that there exists trade-offs between the communication complexity and the number of players involved in the secret
reconstruction. That is, by increasing the number of players to contribute their partial shares, the total communication costs
can be reduced, they also proposed a scheme that achieves the optimal communication complexity. It is not hard to see that
their scheme can be easily modified into a threshold changeable scheme. However, our construction Scheme P-TCSS differs
fromWang and Wong’s scheme in the positions where the secret is hidden and the ways the polynomials f1, f2, . . . , ft ′−t+1
relate to each other. Specifically, they chose t ′ − t + 1 distinct elements e1, . . . , et ′−t+1 ∈ Fq such that fi(ej) = fi+1(ej) for
i ∈ [t ′ − t] and j ∈ [i], and let ( ft ′−t+1(e1), ft ′−t+1(e2), . . . , ft ′−t+1(et ′−t+1)) be the secret. Since n + (t ′ − t + 1) distinct
1 Since polynomials f ′1(x), . . . , f
′
t ′−t+1(x) are used to distribute s
′ = (b0, b1, . . . , bt ′−t ), conditions (1*)–(2*) should be adjusted accordingly: for example,
(2*) should read ft ′−t+1(x) = b0 + b1x+ · · · + bt ′−txt ′−t + · · · + a′t ′−t+1,t ′−1xt
′−1 .
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elements (namely, x1, . . . , xn, e1, . . . , et ′−t+1) in Fq are needed, the condition q ≥ n+ (t ′ − t + 1) is required to hold. Our
scheme relaxes the requirement to q > n, a more natural condition as in Shamir’s threshold scheme. It is not clear whether
our polynomial construction and the geometric construction of Martin et al. [15] are interconvertible in an obvious way for
the general setting. This is an interesting problem that merits further study.
We also point out that all the (t → t ′, n) threshold changeable schemes proposed so far suffer some security problems.
First, for all A ⊆ P and t ≤ |A| < t ′, Definition 2.1 states H(S|TA) ≤ H(S), which means that any less than t ′ players may
get some partial information about the secret from their updated shares. Thus, even if players honestly update their shares
and delete initial ones, it is still not a perfect (t ′, n) threshold scheme. Second, some semi-honest players may retain their
initial shares, and the adversarymay not only tap the channel between the players and the combiner2, but also corrupt some
players directly to obtain the entire history of their shares. Hence by using the initial shares, the scheme constructed above,
as well as many previously known threshold changeable schemes [6,8,15,16,18], cannot prevent t players from recovering
the secret, even though the threshold has been changed to t ′ > t . We attempt to provide some solutions to these problems
for the rest of the paper.
4. The model of threshold changeable secret sharing
In [14], Martin gave a detailed classification of the models of secret sharing schemes that deal with dynamic access
policies. He classified themodels according to the communication channels, advance information about changes, robustness
and some other issues. Based on the security problems of threshold changeable secret sharing schemes we pointed out in
the last section, we are interested in the model in the two phases of Share Distribution and Secret Recovery.
Share Distribution: Dealer is present and secure channels exist between Dealer and each player.
To share a secret s ∈ S among the players, Dealer selects a random string r ∈ R, computes the distribution function
Π(s, r) = (s1, . . . , sn), and then privately sends each share si to Pi.
Secret Recovery: Dealer is present and only broadcast channels are available.
A group of players request to recover the secret. Then it is followed by the two steps below:
• Dealer Broadcast: After confirming the recovery request, Dealer checks the updated security requirement
and broadcasts a message (tj, bj), where tj is the updated threshold and bj is the message that validates the
threshold tj.
• Secret Reconstruction: Any tj players get together and broadcast their updated shares according to the threshold
tj. Then the tj updated shares along with Dealer’s broadcast message bj can uniquely determine the secret s.
We further clarify some related issues as follows:
Advance information about changes. For simplicity, we assume the advance knowledge of possible threshold changes. In
particular, there are N allowable thresholds denoted by t1, . . . , tN . Without loss of generality, assume that 1 < t1 < · · · <
tN ≤ n, where the trivial threshold t = 1 is not considered. All these N thresholds are invalid before Dealer makes the
broadcast at the secret recovery phase, and only the threshold chosen by Dealer is valid after the broadcast. Although our
model assumes such specific information about changes in advance, we have no limitations on N . When N = n − 1, then
every nontrivial threshold is allowable and the model is quite flexible.
Collusion Security Against Passive Adversaries. Our model deals with the adversary who may passively corrupt a group
of players under some threshold. As pointed out in Section 3.2, many threshold changeable schemes [6,8,15,16,18] suffer
from the collusion attack of players holding initial shares. To fix this problem,we introduce the broadcast enforcement term.
That is, before Dealer broadcasts at the recovery phase, any collusion of players cannot reconstruct the secret; after Dealer
broadcasts themessage (tj, bj), any collusion of less than tj players still cannot recover the secret, even they see themessage
bj and retain their initial shares. This is a strict security requirement dealing with dynamic access policies in secret sharing
schemes, and was already studied in the dynamic secret sharing scheme [4] and the threshold scheme with disenrollment
[11]. To resist active adversaries in the threshold changeable schemes, one may apply some techniques in ‘‘verifiable secret
sharing’’ (VSS) [7], which is however beyond the scope of this paper.
One-Fold Changes. Only one-fold change of threshold is considered in our model. Because once the recovery is activated
byDealer broadcasting themessage (tj, bj), the secret can be recovered by any group of tj playerswith the broadcastmessage
bj. If, once again, the threshold is to change to tk > tj, the secret has to be updated. This update of secret is inevitable when
dealing with changes of access policies under strict security requirements. For example, the threshold scheme with L-fold
disenrollment of players [2,14] needs to update the secret at each disenrollment of a player.
For simplicity, we call a secret sharing scheme under this model a ([t1, . . . , tN ], n) threshold changeable scheme.
Specifically, the model in this section only allows one-fold threshold change among N options, while the (t → t ′, n)
threshold changeable scheme defined in Definition 2.1 allows a threshold change from t to t ′ (both thresholds t and t ′
are valid, but security under the second threshold t ′ is discounted as described in Section 3.2). Certainly, it is desirable
2 Some secret sharing models assume that the secret is constructed by having players send their shares through secure channels to a combiner, who
then computes the secret (and possibly returning the result to the players).
Z. Zhang et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 418 (2012) 106–115 111
to consider schemes which allow L-fold changes. We leave this issue to Section 6 and display two simple ([t1, . . . , tN ], n)
threshold changeable schemes in this section. The first scheme is derived form the advance share technique [15], and the
second is from [13,4]. These two schemes are helpful in understanding our construction in the next section and serve as
benchmarks for comparisons.
Scheme 1 ([15]): To share a secret s ∈ Fq with q > n, Dealer independently and uniformly selects r1, . . . , rN ∈ Fq, and for
each i ∈ [N], implements Shamir’s (ti, n) threshold schemewith secret s+ri. More precisely, Dealer independently
selects N random polynomials f1, . . . , fN ∈ Fq[x] such that the degree of fi is less than ti and fi(0) = s + ri. Let
x1, . . . , xn be n distinct nonzero elements of Fq. Player Pi receives the share ( f1(xi), f2(xi), . . . , fN(xi)). In the Dealer
broadcast phase, rj is broadcasted to validate the threshold tj, j ∈ [N].
Scheme 2 ([13,4]): To share a secret s ∈ Fq with q > 2n, Dealer randomly selects a polynomial f ∈ Fq[x] of degree less
than n + 1 such that f (0) = s. Let x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn be 2n distinct nonzero elements of Fq. Player Pi receives
the share f (xi). In the Dealer broadcast phase, the message ( f ( ytj), f ( ytj+1), . . . , f ( yn)) is broadcasted to validate
the threshold tj, j ∈ [N].
5. Computationally secure threshold changeable schemes
In our model of ([t1, . . . , tN ], n) threshold changeable scheme, Scheme 1 and Scheme 2 given in the previous section
have perfect security. But the sizes of both the share and the broadcast message are many times the size of the secret. In
[10] Krawczyk constructed a secret sharing schemewith computational security. He designed the scheme by encrypting the
secret with a secure encryption function and then sharing the decryption key through a perfect threshold scheme. For the
scheme in [10] each player holds a share of size H(S)t + |K |, where H(S) is the length of the secret and |K | denotes the length
of the key. Since |K | usually does not grow with the secret size H(S) but relates to the security parameter only, it can result
in a much smaller share compared to a perfect scheme.
In this section,we combine Krawczyk’smethod and the threshold changeable schemedesigned in Section 3.1 to construct
a computationally secure ([t1, . . . , tN ], n) threshold changeable scheme.
5.1. Definitions
First we introduce some definitions related to computational security.
Definition 5.1 (Computational Indistinguishability [9]). Let X = {Xn}n∈Z≥0 and Y = {Yn}n∈Z≥0 be two probability ensembles
such that each Xn and Yn is a distribution that ranges over strings of length n. We say that X and Y are computationally
indistinguishable if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Dist,
|Pr[Dist(Xn) = 1] − Pr[Dist(Yn) = 1]| < µ(k),
for somenegligible functionµ(k), where the probabilities are taken over the relevant distribution (Xn or Yn) and over internal
coin tosses of algorithm Dist.
Definition 5.2 (Computational Secret Sharing [10]). A (t, n) threshold scheme Π : S × R → S1 × · · · × Sn is called
computationally secure if
(1) For all A ⊆ P and |A| ≥ t , there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time reconstruction algorithm ReconA such that for all
s ∈ S,
Pr[ReconA(Π(s, R)|A, 1k) = s] > 1− µ(k),
for some negligible function µ.
(2) For all A ⊆ P with |A| < t and for all s, s′ ∈ S, the probability ensembles {Π(s, R)|A}|r|:r∈R and {Π(s′, R)|A}|r|:r∈R are
computationally indistinguishable.
Definition 5.3 (Encryption Scheme [9]). An encryption scheme is a triple E = (Gen, Enc,Dec) of three probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms satisfying the conditions:
(1) On input 1k, algorithm Gen (called the key generator) outputs a pair of bit strings, corresponding to the
encryption/decryption keys.
(2) For every pair (e, d) in the range of Gen(1k), and for every α ∈ {0, 1}∗, the algorithms Enc and Dec satisfy
Pr[Dec(d, Enc(e, α)) = α] = 1,
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of algorithms Enc and Dec.
For simplicity, when the encryption key and the decryption key are always the same (i.e. e = d), the scheme E is called
a symmetric (or private key) encryption scheme.
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Definition 5.4 (Semantic Security [9]). Let E = (Gen, Enc,Dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme. Then E is semantically
secure if for all plaintexts m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}poly(k), the probability ensembles of ciphertexts, {Enc(Gen(1k),m)}k∈Z≥0 and
{Enc(Gen(1k),m′)}k∈Z≥0 , are computationally indistinguishable.
Now we define the computational ([t1, . . . , tN ], n) threshold changeable secret sharing scheme as follows.
Definition 5.5 (Computational Threshold Changeable Scheme). A computationally secure ([t1, . . . , tN ], n) threshold change-
able scheme over P consists of a secret sharing scheme Π : S × R → S1 × · · · × Sn, a broadcast message generator {Bi :
S×R → Bi | i ∈ [N]} and a set of reconstructions functions {Recon(i)A : (S1×· · ·×Sn)|A×Bi → S | i ∈ [N], A ⊆ P, |A| ≥ ti},
such that the following three conditions are satisfied:
(1) For all s, s′ ∈ S, the probability ensembles, {Π(s, R)}|r|:r∈R and {Π(s′, R)}|r|:r∈R, are computationally indistinguishable.
(2) For each i ∈ [N] and for all A ⊆ P with |A| ≥ ti, Recon(i)A is polynomial-time computable, and that for all s ∈ S,
Pr[Recon(i)A (Π(s, R)|A,Bi(s, R), 1k) = s] > 1− µ(k),
for some negligible function µ.
(3) For each i ∈ [N] and for all A ⊆ P with |A| < ti, the probability ensembles, {(Π(s, R)|A,Bi(s, R))}|r|:r∈R and
{(Π(s′, R)|A,Bi(s′, R))}|r|:r∈R, where s, s′ ∈ S, are computationally indistinguishable.
5.2. Our construction: Scheme C-TCSS
Let S = F tN−1q be the secret-domain, where q > n. We make the following assumptions in our construction of a
computationally secure ([t1, . . . , tN ], n) threshold changeable scheme:
(a) maxi∈[N]{ti − ti−1} < t1.
(b) There exists a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme E = (Gen, Enc,Dec)with key spaceK . Without loss
of generality, we assume thatK = Fq.
Assumption (a) can be easily achieved by adding new allowable thresholds to shorten the difference between two
allowable thresholds, while assumption (b) is substantial to our scheme.
Our construction Scheme C-TCSS is as follows.
Share Distribution: To share a secret s = (s1, . . . , stN−1) ∈ F tN−1q , Dealer performs the following steps:
(D1) Secretly select a key K ∈ K for the symmetric encryption scheme E .
(D2) Compute (c0, c1, . . . , ctN−1) = (K , Enc(K , s1), . . . , Enc(K , stN−1)).
(D3) Construct the polynomials
fN(x) = c0 + c1x+ · · · + ctN−1xtN−1,
fN−1(x) = fN(x)− xtN−t1gN−1(x),
...
f1(x) = f2(x)− xt2−t1g1(x),
where gi is a random polynomial of degree less than t1 and fi(x) = fi+1(x) − xti+1−t1gi(x) is of degree at most
ti − 1, i ∈ [N − 1]. The random polynomial gi is generated by Algorithm 2 below.
Algorithm 2: Determining gi
Input: ti, ti+1, fi+1
Output: gi(x)
gi(x) = 0 ;
d = deg( fi+1(x)− xti+1−t1gi(x)) ;
while d ≥ ti do
c = [xd]fi+1(x) ;
gi(x) = gi(x)+ cxd−(ti+1−t1) ;
d = deg( fi+1(x)− xti+1−t1gi(x)) ;
end
r(x) = random polynomial of degree at most t1 − (ti+1 − ti)− 1 ;
gi(x) = gi(x)+ r(x) ;
(D4) Independently and randomly select keys K1, . . . , KN ∈ K .
(D5) Let x1, . . . , xn be n distinct nonzero elements of Fq which are made public. For i ∈ [n], Pi receives the share
(Enc(K1, f1(xi)), Enc(K2, f2(xi)), . . . , Enc(KN , fN(xi))).
Dealer Broadcast: To activate an allowable threshold tj (j ∈ [N]), Dealer broadcasts to the players the message
(Kj, Kj+1, . . . , KN).
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The process of share distribution and Dealer broadcast is illustrated in the diagram below.
P1 P2 · · · Pn Broadcast message
Enc(K1, f1(x1)) Enc(K1, f1(x2)) · · · Enc(K1, f1(xn)) K1
Enc(K2, f2(x1)) Enc(K2, f2(x2)) · · · Enc(K2, f2(xn)) K2
...
...
...
...
Enc(KN , fN(x1)) Enc(KN , fN(x2)) · · · Enc(KN , fN(xn)) KN
Secret Reconstruction: After receiving the broadcast message (Kj, Kj+1, . . . , KN), any set of tj players, say A = {P1, . . . , Ptj},
can recover the secret by performing the following steps:
(R1) For each i ∈ [tj], Pi uses Kℓ (which can be found in the broadcast message) to decrypt the ℓ-th coordinate of his
share to obtain fℓ(xi), for each ℓ ∈ [j,N]. Pi then makes ( fj(xi), fj+1(xi), . . . , fN(xi)) known to all other players
in A.
(R2) The players in A can determine fj by polynomial interpolation on fj(x1), . . . , fj(xtj), since fj is of degree at
most tj − 1. Now let i ∈ [j + 1,N] and suppose that fj, . . . , fi−1 have been determined. Since gi−1(x) =
( fi(x) − fi−1(x))/xti−t1 is of degree less than t1 (and hence less than tj), we can determine gi−1 by polynomial
interpolation on fi−1(x1), . . . , fi−1(xtj) and fi(x1), . . . , fi(xtj). From gi−1, we can in turn determine fi (since fi−1
has already been determined). By induction, fN can be determined.
(R3) Let ci = [xi]fN(x), i ∈ [0, tN − 1]. The secret (s1, . . . , stN−1) can be recovered by decrypting each ci, i ∈ [tN − 1],
under the key c0: si = Dec(c0, ci).
5.3. Security and efficiency
We now establish the security and efficiency of Scheme C-TCSS.
Theorem 5.1. If E is a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme, then Scheme C-TCSS is a computationally secure
([t1, . . . , tN ], n) threshold changeable scheme.
Proof. It is easy to verify that the broadcast message enables any tj or more players to recover the secret in polynomial time
by performing steps (R1)–(R3). Hence, condition (2) in Definition 5.5 is satisfied. It remains to show that conditions (1) and
(3) in Definition 5.5 are also satisfied.
First, without seeing the broadcast message, all players have absolutely no information on the keys K1, . . . , KN , except
for some public knowledge known before the scheme. So the semantic security of E implies the computational security of
the secret. More precisely, for distinct s = (s1, . . . , stN−1), s′ = (s′1, . . . , s′tN−1) ∈ S, let (c0, . . . , ctN−1) and (c ′0, . . . , c ′tN−1)
be the vectors computed in step (D2) of the share distribution phase for s and s′, respectively. We have the following:
• If s and s′ are encrypted under the same key K , that is, ci = Enc(K , si) and c ′i = Enc(K , s′i), i ∈ [tN − 1], then by the
rationality of E , different plaintexts cannot give rise to the same ciphertext. Thus, ci ≠ c ′i , for some i ∈ [tN − 1].• If s and s′ are encrypted under different keys K and K ′, then c0 ≠ c ′0 by construction.
In either case, fN ≠ f ′N , where fN(x) =
tN−1
i=0 cixi and f
′
N(x) =
tN−1
i=0 c
′
i x
i. Since fN and f ′N are of degree at most n − 1,
fN(xj) ≠ f ′N(xj) for some j ∈ [n]. Therefore, ability to distinguish between {Π(s, R)}|r|:r∈R and {Π(s′, R)}|r|:r∈R implies ability
to distinguish between {Enc(KN , fN(xj))}KN∈K and {Enc(KN , f ′N(xj))}KN∈K . However, the semantic security of E implies that{Enc(KN , fN(xj))}KN∈K and {Enc(KN , f ′N(xj))}KN∈K are computationally indistinguishable. It follows that {Π(s, R)}|r|:r∈R and{Π(s′, R)}|r|:r∈R are also computationally indistinguishable. Condition (2) of Definition 5.5 is therefore satisfied.
After seeing the broadcast message (Kj, Kj+1, . . . , KN), any tj − 1 players, say P1, . . . , Ptj−1, has knowledge of 
i∈[j−1]

k∈[tj−1]
{Enc(Ki, fi(xk))}
 
i∈[j,N]

k∈[tj−1]
{fi(xk)}
 . (1)
We show that no information of the key K is leaked. Indeed, for K ′ ∈ Fq, let
f ′j (x) = fj(x)+
(−1)tj−1(K ′ − K)tj−1
i=1 xi
tj−1
i=1
(x− xi),
and
f ′i (x) = f ′i−1(x)+ xti−t1gi−1(x),
for i ∈ [j+1,N]. Under these polynomials, f ′j , . . . , f ′tN−1, and the broadcastmessageKj, Kj+1, . . . , KN , Pi obtains f ′i (xk) = fi(xk)
for i ∈ [j, tN ] and k ∈ [tj − 1]. Since the keys K1, . . . , Kj−1 are unknown,i∈[j−1]k∈[tj−1]{Enc(Ki, fi(xk))} induces nothing
new about the key K . Thus, evenwith the information provided by (1), the secret key K is computationally indistinguishable
from any K ′ ∈ Fq. Therefore the secret is computationally secure against any tj − 1 players. 
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The efficiency of a secret sharing scheme can be measured by the size of the shares and the broadcast messages. The
following table displays a comparison between Scheme C-TCSS and the two schemes in Section 4.
Share size Broadcast message size Security
Scheme 1 N · H(S) H(S) Perfect
Scheme 2 H(S) (n− tj + 1)H(S) Perfect
Scheme C-TCSS NtN−1H(S)
N−j+1
tN−1 H(S) Computational
In practice, N is usually a small integer (such as N = 3) corresponding to the ‘‘low, middle, high’’ level of security in
computers, while tN could be linearly related to n. Even if tN is a small constant, we always have ti > i for i ∈ [N]. Therefore,
by relaxing the security requirement from information-theoretic to computational, the efficiency is significantly improved.
6. Disenrollment and L-fold changes
In previous sections we discuss changes of the threshold in a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. In practice the
number n may also change, corresponding to the enrollment or disenrollment of players. Dealing with the enrollment of
players is straightforward by using secure channels betweenDealer and the newcomers or secure channels between original
players and the newcomers. As to the disenrollment of the players, since it is closely related to the problem of threshold
change, in the below we give a simple implementation of disenrollment based on our model of ([t1, . . . , tN ], n) threshold
changeable scheme. Thus it simultaneously allows threshold changes and multiple disenrollment of players.
For simplicity, suppose at most t players may quit the scheme after the share distribution phase and {t1, . . . , tN} is the
set of allowable thresholds. It is reasonable to assume that the allowable threshold tN is still meaningful when t players quit.
Hence, tN ≤ n− t . For i ∈ [N] and j ∈ [0, t], let tij = ti + j. By regarding {tij | i ∈ [N], j ∈ [0, t]} as the new set of allowable
thresholds, we construct a threshold changeable scheme like Scheme C-TCSS. For secret recovery after the threshold has
been chosen as ti (i ∈ [N]), and j (j ∈ [0, t]) players quit the scheme, Dealer publishes the shares of the j players who have
quited and broadcasts the message related to the threshold tij. It is easy to verify that the scheme constructed in this way is
a ([t1, . . . , tN ], n) threshold changeable scheme that can tolerate the disenrollment of up to t players.
As pointed out in Section 4, the above scheme just involves one-fold change of the threshold and disenrollment of
players, while previous threshold schemes [2,5,11] mostly considered L-fold disenrollment of players. To deal with L-fold
changes of the threshold and disenrollment of players, we suggest to use the advance key technique with computational
security. Precisely, at the initial phase Dealer distributes to each player a secret key. Then Scheme C-TCSS enhanced with
disenrollment is implemented. Once another change is required, Dealer computes the new shares according to the updated
secret and access policies, and encrypts Pi’s share with the secret key ki that has been secretly distributed to Pi at the initial
phase. Then at the recovery phase Dealer broadcasts the encrypted shares needed to validate the changed access policies,
along with the corresponding broadcast message.
Therefore, our scheme, apart from the additional capability for simultaneously dealing with L-fold changes of threshold
and disenrollment of players, has the collusion security as the broadcast enforced threshold scheme in [11], and the
appealing efficiency as the computational scheme in [5] which is more efficient than the perfect schemes [2].
Acknowledgements
The authors are indebted to the anonymous referee for the valuable comments on the original version of this paper.
The first author’s research was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos.
60821002/F02, 11001254), 973 Project (No. 2011CB302401) and the Foundation of President of AMSS, CAS. The second,
third and fifth author’s research was supported in part by the National Research Foundation of Singapore under Research
Grant NRF-CRP2-2007-03. The second author’s researchwas also supported in part by the Nanyang Technological University
under Research GrantM58110040. The fifth author’s researchwas also supported in part by the Australian Research Council
under ARC Discovery Project DP0665035.
References
[1] S.G. Barwick, W.-A. Jackson, K.M. Martin, Updating the parameters of a threshold scheme by minimal broadcast, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 51 (2)
(2005) 620–633.
[2] B. Blakley, G.R. Blakley, A.H. Chan, J.L. Massey, Threshold schemes with disenrollment, in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO ’92 (Santa Barbara, CA,
1992), in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 740, Springer, Berlin, 1993, pp. 540–548.
[3] G.R. Blakley, Safeguarding cryptographic keys, in: Proceedings of the National Computer Conference, American Federation of Information Processing
Societies, 1979, pp. 313–317.
[4] C. Blundo, A. Cresti, A. De Santis, U. Vaccaro, Fully dynamic secret sharing schemes, Theor. Comput. Sci. 165 (2) (1996) 407–440.
[5] C. Charnes, J. Pieprzyk, R. Safavi-Naini, Conditionally secure secret sharing schemes with disenrollment capability, in: CCS’94: Proceedings of the 2nd
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1994, pp. 89–95.
[6] L. Chen, D. Gollmann, C.J. Mitchell, Key escrow inmutually mistrusting domains, in: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security Protocols,
in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1189, Springer-Verlag, London, UK, 1997, pp. 139–153.
Z. Zhang et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 418 (2012) 106–115 115
[7] B. Chor, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, B. Awerbuch, Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults, in: FOCS’85: Proceedings
of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 1985, pp. 383–395.
[8] Y. Desmedt, S. Jajodia, Redistributing secret shares to new access structures and its applications, Tech. Rep. ISSE-TR-97-01, George Mason University,
Fairfax, Virginia, 1997.
[9] O. Goldreich, Foundations of Cryptography II: Basic Applications, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[10] H. Krawczyk, Secret sharingmade short, in: Advances in Cryptology –CRYPTO’93: Proceedings of the 13thAnnual International Cryptology Conference,
in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 773, Springer, 1993, pp. 136–146.
[11] M. Li, R. Poovendran, Broadcast-enforced disnrollment in threshold schemes, SAC 2003, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 3006, pp. 101–116.
[12] A. Maeda, A. Miyaji, M. Tada, Efficient and unconditionally secure verifiable threshold changeable scheme, in: ACISP 2001: Proceedings of the 6th
Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2119, Springer, 2001, pp. 403–416.
[13] K.M. Martin, Untrustworthy participants in secret sharing schemes, in: M.J. Ganley (Ed.), Cryptography and Coding III, Oxford University Press, 1993,
pp. 255–264.
[14] K.M. Martin, Dynamic access policies for unconditionally secure secret sharing schemes, in: Proceedings of IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW
05, Awaji Island, Japan, 2005, pp. 61–66.
[15] K.M. Martin, J. Pieprzyk, R. Safavi-Naini, H. Wang, Changing thresholds in the absence of secure channels, in: ACISP’99: Proceedings of the 4th
Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1587, Springer, 1999, pp. 177–191.
[16] K.M. Martin, R. Safavi-Naini, H. Wang, Bounds and techniques for efficient redistribution of secret shares to new access structures, Comput. J. 42 (8)
(1999) 638–649.
[17] A. Shamir, How to share a secret, Commun. ACM 22 (11) (1979) 612–613.
[18] R. Steinfeld, J. Pieprzyk, H. Wang, Lattice-based threshold changeability for standard Shamir secret-sharing schemes, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 53
(7) (2007) 2542–2559.
[19] H. Wang, D.S. Wong, On secret reconstruction in secret sharing schemes, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 54 (1) (2008) 473–480.
